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Derive tokens

The holder of an API key can mint a short-lived JWT or macaroon, signed by Ory Talos, that carries a chosen subset of the parent key's authority. Scopes, expiration, and custom claims are sealed into the token at mint time. Verification then needs only a signature and expiry check, with no database round-trip.

Derive tokens when you want to:

  • Hand out narrow, short-lived credentials without exposing the parent key. Each derivation drops scopes, shortens the TTL, and attaches application-specific custom_claims (for example, tenant or role). Scopes never exceed the parent's, and the derived TTL is capped at the parent's remaining lifetime.
  • Verify tokens at the edge or inside your own services. Ory Talos signs JWTs with EdDSA or RS256 and publishes the public keys at GET /v2alpha1/derivedKeys/jwks.json. Any service that holds that JWKS verifies a JWT locally, without calling Ory Talos on every request, which keeps verification resilient to database outages. Macaroons are HMAC-bound and require verification by Ory Talos.
  • Pick the right algorithm for the job. Use TOKEN_ALGORITHM_JWT when third parties or your own edge verify the token using the JWKS. Use TOKEN_ALGORITHM_MACAROON for contextual attenuation (third-party caveats) when third-party verification isn't required. For format details, see derived JWTs and derived macaroons.
  • Exchange API keys for JWTs at the edge. A gateway or proxy accepts a long-lived API key from the caller and exchanges it for a short-lived derived JWT. Backends behind the gateway verify the JWT locally against the JWKS, so the data path stays stateless even when the caller's credential is long-lived.
  • Bound agent authority in agentic workflows. An orchestrator holds the parent API key and mints a narrow, short-lived derived token for each agent or tool call. A leaked or misbehaving agent is then bounded by the derived token's scopes and TTL, not the parent's full authority. Use macaroons when sub-agents need to attenuate further without contacting Ory Talos.

The same endpoint (POST /v2alpha1/admin/apiKeys:verify) accepts both token types and the parent API key.

caution

Derived tokens are bearer credentials. Treat them like any short-lived session token: prefer TTLs of 5–60 minutes, never log or persist them, and read stateless derived-token verification before choosing a TTL. Revoking the parent key blocks new derivations immediately, but already-issued tokens stay valid until they expire.

First, issue a parent key for token derivation.

RESPONSE=$(talos keys issue "derive-test" \
  --actor user_1 \
  --scopes "read,write" \
  --format json \
  -e "$TALOS_URL" 2>/dev/null)

echo "$RESPONSE" | jq .

export API_SECRET=$(echo "$RESPONSE" | jq -er '.secret')

Derive a JWT​

Send the parent key's secret to the derive endpoint with TOKEN_ALGORITHM_JWT.

RESPONSE=$(talos keys derive-token "$API_SECRET" \
  --algorithm jwt \
  --ttl 1h \
  --claims '{"role": "viewer", "tenant": "acme"}' \
  --format json \
  -e "$TALOS_URL" 2>/dev/null)

echo "$RESPONSE" | jq .

export JWT_TOKEN=$(echo "$RESPONSE" | jq -er '.token.token')

Request fields​

The key fields are credential (the parent API key secret), algorithm (TOKEN_ALGORITHM_JWT or TOKEN_ALGORITHM_MACAROON), optional ttl, scopes (a subset of the parent's), and custom_claims. For the complete field reference, see the DeriveToken API reference.

For HTTP API requests, ttl accepts extended formats such as 1y, 1mo, 1w, and 1d, and compounds like 1y6mo, in addition to standard Go durations. The CLI --ttl flag expects standard Go durations such as 1h or 30m.

Response​

The response contains a token object with token.token (the derived token string), token.expire_time, token.scopes, and token.claims. For the complete field reference, see the DeriveToken API reference.

Verify a derived token​

The same :verify endpoint verifies derived tokens and API keys.

talos keys verify "$JWT_TOKEN" -e "$TALOS_URL"

The response includes the token's scopes, actor, and the metadata inherited from the parent key.

Derive a macaroon​

Macaroons use HMAC-based authentication with support for caveats.

talos keys derive-token "$API_SECRET" \
  --algorithm macaroon \
  --ttl 30m \
  -e "$TALOS_URL"

JWT vs macaroon​

FeatureJWTMacaroon
VerificationSignature-based (can verify client-side with JWKS)HMAC-based (requires server verification)
SizeLarger (base64 JSON + signature)Smaller (binary format)
Client-side verificationYes, via JWKS endpointNo
Custom claimsYesYes (as caveats)

JWKS endpoint​

For client-side JWT verification, fetch the public keys from the JWKS endpoint at /v2alpha1/derivedKeys/jwks.json.

talos jwk get -e "$TALOS_URL"

The endpoint serves the active public signing keys plus any retired keys still inside the verification window. Each entry includes a kid field that matches the kid header on tokens signed with that key.

Client-side caching and refresh​

Cache the JWKS response on the client so verification doesn't call Ory Talos on every request. Recommended settings:

SettingRecommended valueNotes
Cache TTL5–15 minutesBounds how long a rotated-out key keeps verifying.
Refresh-on-missEnabledIf a token's kid is unknown, refetch JWKS once.
Refresh failure modeServe staleIf the refetch fails, keep the previous keys until TTL.

Most JWT libraries (jose for Node, PyJWT/PyJWKClient for Python, go-jose, and jjwt for Java) support these patterns natively: set the cache TTL and enable refresh-on-unknown-kid. Don't poll the endpoint on a fixed interval shorter than 1 minute. It adds load without shrinking the practical revocation window, which is bounded by the longest issued token TTL.

When you rotate signing keys, keep the previous key in the JWKS response (mark it retired in the server config and don't delete the JWK) for at least the longest issued token TTL plus the maximum client cache TTL. Otherwise, clients with a freshly cached JWKS that lacks the new kid reject valid tokens until their cache expires.

Enforcement at derive time​

All checks happen before Ory Talos signs the token. If any check fails, Ory Talos issues no token.

  • Parent must be KEY_STATUS_ACTIVE. Ory Talos rejects a revoked, expired, or unknown parent key.
  • Scopes must be a subset of the parent. Requesting any scope the parent doesn't have returns 403 Forbidden. Omitting scopes inherits the full parent set.
  • TTL is capped at the parent's remaining lifetime. A ttl longer than the time left until parent.expire_time returns 400 Bad Request. The configured credentials.api_keys.max_ttl also applies.
  • Inherited fields can't be overridden. Ory Talos copies the parent's sub, actor_id, key_id, metadata, visibility, and CIDR allowlist and seals them into the token claims. Requests can't set them directly.
  • Reserved claim names are stripped from custom_claims. Ory Talos owns the JWT header, the standard claims, and its own short-form claims. It removes these names from any custom_claims payload before signing: jti, sub, iss, aud, iat, exp, nbf, nid, akid, pid, tty, oid, scp, scope, meta, vis, and acl. Use any other key for application-defined claims.

What verification checks​

Derived-token verification is stateless: no database lookup, no parent-key status check, and no re-evaluation of the parent's current scopes, rate-limit policy, or visibility. The data plane only checks:

  1. Signature against the JWKS (JWT) or the HMAC secret (macaroon).
  2. exp and nbf windows.
  3. Issuer matches the configured current or retired issuer.
  4. Network ID in the token claims matches the request's tenant, as defense-in-depth against tokens from another tenant.
  5. CIDR allowlist sealed into the token, against the request's source IP. This enforces the parent's IP restrictions at verify time without re-reading the parent.

A revoked parent therefore blocks new derivations immediately but doesn't invalidate already-issued tokens; they stay valid until exp. If your threat model needs faster invalidation:

  • Use short TTLs. 5–15 minutes for service-to-service, 15–60 minutes for user sessions, and 1–5 minutes for sensitive operations. Avoid TTLs longer than your operational MTTR.
  • Rotate the JWK signing keys. Tokens signed with the rotated-out key fail signature verification once you remove the old kid from the JWKS. This invalidates every derived token signed with that key, not only those from one parent.
  • Apply your own deny list at the gateway if you need per-jti revocation. Talos doesn't maintain one for derived tokens.

Next steps​

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